The Commerce Commission is very pleased to announce the appointment of Brent Alderton as the new CEO from 1 January 2011. He replaces Nicholas Hill who is leaving the Commission at the end of this year.

Mr Hill, who has been the Commission's CEO since the position was created in June 2008, is leaving to set up an office in Auckland for the consulting company MartinJenkins.

Mr Alderton is currently the Commission's General Manager, Regulation, leading the Commission's work on developing the Part 4 (Commerce Act) regime and delivering the telecommunications work programme. He joined the Commission in early 2009. Prior to that, he was Commercial Manager for New Zealand Oil and Gas Limited.

Mr Alderton's work experience also includes time in Corporate Finance at Deloitte, Corporate Strategy at the Electricity Corporation and in policy and analysis roles at the New Zealand Treasury and the Department of Social Welfare. He has a BA (Hons) in Economics and an MA in Political Studies.

"Brent Alderton's appointment is a credit to the leadership he has shown in the development work under Part 4 and a reflection of the very high regard in which he is held, both by Commissioners and staff within the Commission," said Commerce Commission Chair Dr Mark Berry.

"The Commission has undergone significant organisational restructure under Nicholas Hill's leadership. We look forward to Brent leading the organisation into a period of further performance improvement."

Background

In October 2008, Part 4 of the Commerce Amendment Act introduced significant changes to the regulation of suppliers of electricity lines services, gas pipeline services and specified airport services at Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch airports. These services are subject to regulation as they are supplied in markets where there is little or no competition, and little or no likelihood of a substantial increase in competition.

The purpose of these changes to Part 4 is to promote the long-term benefits of consumers. The changes are intended to ensure that suppliers of regulated services have incentives to innovate and invest, have incentives to improve efficiency at a quality that consumers demand, share the benefits of efficiency through lower prices and have a limited ability to extract excessive profits.